Introduction
THIs paper investigates some of the issues discussed in the recent literature on the shadow wage of labour in the presence of ;n institutionially determined rural-urban wage gap. The analysis is presented within the framework of the Little-Mirrlees formulation [5] which distinguishes two elements in the opportunity cost of employing an additional worker in the urban sector: (i) the value of the output forgone due to the use of a unit of labour; and (ii) the cost to the economy of the additional -consumiption due to the transfer of a worker from the traditional to the new activity. The latter is important because the urban wage gap is higher than the level of consumption a worker would enjoy in his alternative rural employment. The rural-urban wage gap is als6 '3onnected with the generation of urban unemployment as rnigrants to the urban labour market are induced to 'invest' in a spell of unemployment in the expectation of obtaining employment at a higher wage. Cf. Todaro [12] . A formulation of the shadow wage in the presence of the wage gap must then take into account the effect of creating an additional job in the urban sector on the part, of the urban unemployed as well as the two factors specified by Little-Mirrlees.
The present discussion concentrates on two points which have been inadequately dealt with in the papers on the subject by Harberger [2] , Harris and Todaro [3] , Lal [4] , and Stiglitz [10, 11] . The first is concerned with the problem of defining a migration function which will determine the volume of migration in response to the rural-urban wage gap, and hence the size of the pool of the unemployed in the urban market. Both Harberger and Stiglitz reach the result that the shadow wage will equal the market wage if the equilibrium rate of unemployment remains unchanged in the urban area after the creation of an additional job in tho area. But neither of them recognizes the point that the actual magnitude of the equilibrium rate of unemployment is crucial to the determination of the value of the shadow wage-and that the magnitude of the unemployment rate depends very much on the migration function implicit it the specific formulation of the equilibrium condition of the labour market. We will show how DIPAK MAZTMDAR
TABLE I
Summary of notationrs SWR shadow wage rate S . premium on savings relative to consumption W wage in the 'formal' urban sector AP average product of a worker in agriculture (rural sector) Alp miiargiiial product of a worker iri agriculture (rural sector) C opportunity cost of a migranit from the rural to the urban area p probability of obtaining a formal sector job L total urban labour force N total employed in the urban formal sector U total number of unemployed or those in the informal sector who are seeking jobs in the urban formal sector fraction of W which equals the income of the migrant in town while he is searching for a job in the formal sector j fraction of W which equals C m fraction of W which equals MP a fraction of TV which equials AP Y (= yN) the income produced in the formal (0) sector P the income produeed in the informal (U) sector y the percentage rate of growth of employment in the 0-sector c> the marginal propensity to consume U-goods on the part of the U-sLctor B the margiinal propensity to coiisunie U-goods for the 0-sector WA income per period in the rtural area given up by the migrant or his family P(A) present value of the incomes stream of 1IA per period E(H) present valuie of the expected income stream in town during the migrant's job search E(V) present value of the income stream of the migrant from his formal sector wage h fraction of W which the migranit gets per period in town during his job search i effectiv e rate of discount used by the migrant D expected duiration of the formal sector job q average rate of turnover in the formal sector tu expected duration of unemployment in town before the migrant gets a formal sector job clifferentvalues oftlhe shado-w% wage are reached with different specifications of the equilibrium coI(dition. The seconcd objective of the paper is to incorporate explicitly in the analysis the problem -f financing the urban unemployed during their period of search-a subject which has been curiously neglected in the literature of the shadow -wage. Two specific cases of financing during the migrants' job search are considered: (i) the case in which the migrant is maintained by income transfers from hiis rural family ('rural financing'); and (ii) the case in which the migrant maintains himself by working part-time in the urban traditional informal sector ('self-financing').
In Section I we prcsent a formulation of the shadow wage which combines a simple (and extreme) migration function with the assumption of rural financing of the unemployed-leading to a Harberger-type result that the shadow wage would equal the market wage. In Section II an expression for the shadow wage is derived with a more reasonable (and realistic) migration function, but still retaining the assumption of rural fina;icing. Section III considers the problkT n on the alternative assumption of '13elf-financing'. The models of SecL-,'. II and III (unhke that of Section 1, as we shall see) require a multi-period setting. A specific example of a multiperiod -model is considered in this paper, and alternative values for the shadow wage are derived in terms of this example. In the Appendix we turn briefly to the formulation of Stiglitz who also considers a multi-period model, but it is shown that his neglect of the key question of financing the unemployed leads to a gross exaggeration of the eqrilibrium unemployment rate-and hence to the false Harberger-type result that the shadow wage will equal the market wage if the unemployment rate remains unchanged.
Section I
It; will be helpful to the subsequent discussion if we briefly recall the Little-Mirrlees formulation of the shadow wage rate. When an additional worker is employed in the 'urban' sector, there is a loss in output equal to the marginal product of the worker in the rural sector (= MP). There is also an increase in consumption equal to the difference between the wage at which the worker is employed (W) and the marginal product in the rural sector (MP). The expression for the shadow wage is then:
where S (> 1) is the value of a unit of savings in terms of consumption.
The economics behind the second term in the expression is that the entire increase in consumption is not a cost to the economy: a portion 1/S of the increase in consumption has to be subtracted firom the total to give the true social cost in terms of the numeraire 'savings'. The above expression reduces to
SWR W-5(W-MP). (1a)
The term within brackets being positive, the shadow wage is below the market wage.
We can use this firamework to interpret a model of the shadow wage which gives a Harberger-type result. ' The basic equilibrium in the labour market I Harberger's formalization is not available in published form. Apart from the verbal statement given in (2] , a more formal model presented by him at a semin in Oxford is reported by Sen [9] and Lal [4] . It is a formulation given by the latter whioh is used here. Bee [9] , p. 498, and [10] , p. 118.
is achieved by the condition that the expected wvage of a job seeker migrating to the urban aroa is equated to his output foregone (MIIP):1 MP = pTW. (3) 'p' the probability of obtaining an urban job is given by the ratio of the employed (N) to the total labour force (L) in the urban area:
P N (4)
From (4) dL (
Thus creating an additional job in the urban area adds l/p workers to the labour force. The increase in the number of unemployed is (lip)-1. The marginal rate of unemployment is (!1-)/! or (1 -p), which is the same as the average rate. Thus the migration function implied in (4) ensures that the rate of urban unemployment remains the same, even with additional job creation in the urban area. Given the foregoing adjustment in the urban labour market through induced migration, we can calculate the shadow wage rate by exploring (a) the loss in output, and (b) the increase in consumption in the economy c, la Little-Mirrlees when an additional job is created in the urban area.
(a) Since I/p migrants are attracted from the rural sector due to the job creation, loss in output = MP = W (using (3)). (6) ,v) IVhat about the increase in consumption due to the migration of Il/p workers? In Harberger's view, a unit of savings at the margin is equally valuable as a unit of consumption, i.e. S in (1 a) is equal to unity. If this is so, then t,he 'consumption effect' need not be considered. But it will be shown now that even if the value of S is greater than unlity so that the consumptioi effect becomes iniportant the Harberger result can be derived if we make a specific assumption about the method of financing the jobseeker during his period of search. It is that the migrant searchingy for a job in the urban area is maintained by his rural family. That is to say, even though the migrant is separated from the rural family, all the workers still form part of the same economic unit in sharing the total income accruing to the unit.
Given this assumption about financing the job-seekor during his period of search, the increase in consumption duo to the employment of an 4IO RIURAL-URBAN 'WAGE GAP, AMIGRATION, A-ND 8IADOW WAGE additional worker in the urban area is easily calculated. The employed worker increases consumption to the extent of the wage earned. (W). 1iP migrants are attracted to the urban area. Thus the income of (and consumption of) the rural families (including the migra-+-) falls by (1/p)MP, Thus the net increase of consumption in the economy equals:
W-MP = O (using (3)).
(Note that it does not matter how the decrease in consumption is distributed between the migrants and the members of his family remaining in the rural ai ia.)
We can then conclude that the shadow wage rate is given solely by the loss in output due to the induced migration and from (6) This 'catchy' result is thus seen to rest on three assumptions:
(i) the financing of the job-seeker by the rural family just disetssed; (ii) the migration function implicit in equation (4); (iii) the equilibrium condition given in equation (3) . Before turning to an examination of the migration function, it might be relevant to discuss the specific nature of the assuim)ptioni (iii). It has b(en noted in the literature that when the migrant is a personal incolne maximizer, his supply price will be given by the average product of the family farm rather than the marginal product (which will be the case when he is motivated by the ethic of maximizing family income).' From this it might be concluded that all we have to do is to replace MP by AP in equation (3) . The analysis, however, needs to be a bit more complicated than this for the following reason. If there is rural financing of the migrant during his job search, then if he is unable to find a job in town he receives an i nconme equal to gW from his rural family. The eqi.uilibriuiu condition for such a migrant, equating his loss in the rural area to the expecte(l gail in town will be given by:
Now if gW is equal to AP, i.e. the migrant gets from his family in town exactly what he got in the rural area then equation (3k) breaks down. Migration for the individual is costless, even tbou_g,ii the family left in the rural area makes a loss. Clearly, for migration with personal in ome m,aximization we must have gW < AP. The rural family can enter into a wlhole range of arrangements with the potential migrant to the town fLbout, the level of financing required-and the agreemt it may also include a provision DIPAK MAZUMDA-A 411 for transfer of income back to the fwnily if the migrant gets a job. 1anv solutions exist to the problem we are considering. It may, however, be worth while to confine ourselves to what might be called the case of 'pure' personal income maximization. This case occurs when migration of an individual has a cost from the point of view of the migrant, but is ('oStless from the point of view of the rest of the family. It is given by the coil(litiofl:
(3") The family, in other words, compensates the migrant in town to the full extent of the saving due to his departure (the difference between his claim on consumption and his contribution to yLoduction in the farm household). From (3') and (3") we get the equilibrium condition:
(3 a) Comparing (3 a) with (3) it is clear that the value of p is higher in this case, and the equilibrium unemployment rate in town (l-p) is lower.
As before, the loss in output is MP/p and the increase in consumption in the economy {W-(MP/p)}, when I/p persons migrate in response to an additional worker being hired at the wage W. In terms of the L-M formula, and using (3 a), in this case:
Since AP > MP, this case of 'pure' personalincome maximization yields the conclusion that the shadow wage will be less than the market wage. ' The question arises: how likely is it that the average product of a rural family would be greater than the marginal product of a family member. It should be remembered that even if the marginal product of a unit of labour time (after taking into account the hours of work contributed in the aggregate by the family) is very low, the marginal product of a particular worker could be high because of work-sharing arrangements within the family. With equal work-sharing, the marginal product will be the same for every worker and near to the average product (ignoring non-productive members). 2 But in all likelihood work will be shared unequally, with both older and younger workers bearing less of a burden than prime-age males. Since individual migrants are likely to be young males, their marginal product could be less-but not all that much less-than the average product of the rural family.
Another point, however, has to be made in this connection. As individuals differ in terms of their efficiency, so they would differ in their leisure preferences. If there are larger differences involved in the latter, then equal or nearly equal work-sharing would be difficult to achieve in the family. The head of the family might allocate work so as to equalize the values of disutility of effort for the productive workers at the margin. Looked at this way, potential migrants from particular families may well have very low values of their marginal product, relative to the average product of the family. This is particularly likelyfor personal income maximizers whose ties with the other family members ha7e been, by definition, loosened.
Section II
Let us now turn to an examination of the migration function implied in (4). The probability of obtaining an urban job in any period will be given by the ratio of new jobs becoming available in the period to the total number of job-seekers competing for the jobs. Thus when we have an expression for the probability given by the ratio of the employed to the total labour force as in (4) it is implicitly assumed that there is a complete turnover of labour in every period-i.e. no job lasts for more than one period, and the entire labour force (including the employed and the unemployed) compete afresh for all jobs in the next period. Only on this assumption will the creation of one extra job induce in-migration of I/p new job-seekers. Clearly, such an extreme assumption about the turnover of labour grossly exaggerates both the rate of urban unemployment for a given wage-gap and the size of induced migration. If, for example, the urban wage is three times the marginal product of labour in agriculture, the rate of unemployment (I -p) will be 66 per cent-from (3), and the creation of one extra job will induce three workers to join the urban labour force.
Evidently the unrealistic nature of the expression for the probability of obtaining an urban job of the implied migration function is a consequence of the use of a simplified one-period model. If we assume that a potential migrant thinks in terms of a job in the urban organized sector lasting wie period only as the model in Section I does, the logical corollary is the assumption of a total turnover of labour in each period. In order to be able to consider a more realistic model of the urban labour market in which jobs do not just last for one period, we should really work with a multiperiod model.
It should, however, appear on reflection, and should be clearer from the subsequent analysis, that a multi-period framework is relevant to only one of the elements involved in the formula of the shadow wage. This is the equilibrium condition which equates the expected gain from migration to its expected cost, and hence determines the volume of job-seekers in the urban market in any period. This volume, given the rate of job creation iu the iniitrkett,, detterminins the probability of obt.aining, an urban job (p) in each period. Other parts of the shadow wage formula-the loss in output or the extra coni,sumption generated-are values per period which are not affected by the specification of the time-horizon of the model. In what follows we shall first derive an expressioin for the shadow wage on tile basis ofan iindetermnirnedp. The value ofp will b-subsequently determiniied fro(m the e(lili6rium condlition of migration in a mulfi-l)eriod setting.
Let urban eniplo3rnient grow at a steady coilstant rate (dependlingl oni the rate of net expansion and of labour t,urnover). Then the t-number of jobs create(l at any period of time is yN, where N is t1e stock of urban jobs in this period. Tn,x, jobs wiLJ be eorml)ete(d for by (U+yN) number of jobseelkers, of which yN are absorbedl into enmployrent and U remain unemnploy,ed. (U is left to b-(letermine(l at a later stage from the e(illi)rium condition of nmigration.)
The probability of getting an urban job at any time period can then be redefined as: yN
We have from (4 a):
dLy(I-p)
assuming that a small increase in the number of urban jobs does not increase the rate of growth of urban employinent perceptibly. It might be objected that in some cases the public investment projects for which we need the sha(low wage would have more than a marginal impact on the rate of growth of employmeut in the particular labour market. It is, however, imliportant to realize that y-like the accounting rate of interest -is a parameter which is giveni for a paiticular bundle of projects, and (lepen(ls partly on other factors in the labour market concerned. The shadow "vagre d1erived on the basis of the given y helps us to choose between the specific projects within the bundle. If the size of the bundle being considered is signifieanftly alter, d a different y will have to be adopted for the next round of calcuilat,ions.
Thu-s, in terms of (10), when one extra job is created, using the values of the paramieters of our example, y(l-p)/p number of workers migrate in search of urban jobs in addition to the one required to fill the new job.
o.E.P.3
Ee 414 RURAIURBAN WAGE GAP, MIGRATION, AND SHADOW WAGE The rate of unemployment in the urban area remains unchanged.' It is worth emphasizing that this model gives the same result as that of Section I in suggesting that induced migration will be such as to maintain the rate of unemployment: the difference is in the magnitude of the unemployment and migration rates predicted. We now derive an expression for the shadow wage, taking into account (a) the loss in output and (b) the increase in consumption, given the number of new migrants as suggested by (10) .
Increase in consumption = W-dL MP.
Hence dL1\ dL
substituting for the value of dL/dN from (10). The relationship of (13) to the Herberger-type formulation of Section I can be seen if we treat the latter as a special case of (13) in which y = 1, and p = m. The SWB in (13) then reduces to the market wage W. When we allow for the possibility of an urban job which lasts more than one period both of these restrictive conditions wil have to be dropped.
The equilibrium rate of migration and the determtnation of p
We can now replace the equilibrium condition of migration given in equations (3) and (3 a) of Section I by a better specified model with a multiperiod horizon which determine U and hence p in equation (4 a).
The simplifying assumptions made are the following: (i) Migrants coming to the urban labour market make a once-for-all decision on migration on the basis of expectations of obtaining a job in the formal sector of the urban market. That is to say, once the decision to migrate is taken there is no 'looking back', and migrants stay in the urban market until they get an urban job.
vii) The fixed costs of migration are small in relation to the cost of output forgone and of maintenance in the urban area during the period of search. (iii) Once a migraint obtains anyrban job it lasts 'for ever', that is to say, the service in the urban job once obtained, is expected to be long compared to the period spent in searching for such a job.
(iv) The alternative to migration is the certainty of a rural job at the going level of productivity (or earnings).
Consider a typical migrant at the point of time when he is deciding if it pays him to migrate to look for a job in towvnl. He has the, certainty of an income stream in the rural sector whose present value would be given by (assuming constant agricultural earnings (W.a) for simplicity):
If he migrates to town he must consider the expected present value of his urban income E(V), and the expected present value of the income he will get while he is finding a permanent urban job, B(H). (Note that E(H) could be negative.)
We must have, for equilibrium:
Let p = the probability of getting a job in any period, VI = the present value of his income stream from urban employment if he finds employment in period t.
We have:
and V= VI since he is getting the same incomie (t-1) years later (assuming his total lifetime employment is long compared to the period of search). We can then calculate the expected present value of the urban income stream as:
Let hW the fraction of W per period which the migrant gets during his job search-a sort of unemployment pay from his rural Lamity. Then 
E(H) =1 +(1+)
whence we have (remembering that WA = jW):
With family income maximization j = m, and h-0, on the assumption that the migrant can be financed during his period of search by income transfers within the family. if in fact the family has to borrow money which has an interest cost, h will. be negative.
If in the case of pure personal maximization of Section I, the migrant is able to subsist during his period of search on the amount the family is willing to transfer to him, we will have j = a and h = a-mrn
The determination of U and the SWR
The equilibrium rate of unemployment in the urban market U/L (= u), it will be recalled, is given by the expression y(l-P)/v(l-p)+r. Let us now see how the predicted unemployment rate from our model turns out for alternative values of the relevant variables. The rate of job creation m the formal urban sector is quite modest in most LDCs (including that due to labour turnover); say y = 0*1. It is seen that the predicted unemployment rate is reduced significantly from the results of the Harberger-type single-period model. It would also appear that u is more sensitive to variations in the value of m than those of i for family income maximization (examples A). The predicted values of u are also significantly less for personal income maximization as can be seen from the line B of the table, but only for relatively high interest rates. 
Section III
It has been assumed in the last section that migrants coming to the urban market are financed during their period of search by the families from which they came. It has become increasingly apparent to observers recently that one of the major characteristics of the urban labour market in LDCs is the existence of a large 'informal' sector. 2 The characteristic of the informal sector is that entry is easy, so that a migrant seeking to obtain employment in the high-wage sector can finance himself by participating in the former. At the same time unlike employmeint, in the 'formal' sector-which tends to be contractual and full-time-much of the work in the informal sector is either self-employment or is in the market for casual labour which allows for variable hours or days of work. Thus, it is feasible for the migrant to search for a job in the formal sector even when he is earning a living in the informal sector.
Harberger [2] puts forward the proposition that the wage rate in the informal sector should be accepted as the shadow wage, since in the absence 1 The reader mnay note from (13 a) that the condition for the SWR to equal W can be expressed alternatively as m 1-u, or as y = i/(1+i). Thusif yis 01, iwiU need to beOl11. 2 The christening of the sector as 'informal' was done by the ILO Employment Mission to Kenya which hais also served to give the stamp of official approval on the distinction between the two sectors. It has been called the 'unprotected' sector by Harberger of any institutional maintenance of his wage rate in this sector the market will be cleared, and the established wage should represent the supply price of labour. There are, however, several important arguments against this proposal.
(i) If the 'informal' sector provides an opportunity for migrants to earn a living wage while searching for a more permanent job in the formal sector, then the market clearing wage in the former will be less thaun the supply price of labour to the urban market. Mvigrants, in other words, will be willing to take a 'Cult' in their supply-price during the period of job search in the expectation that they will be enjoying a higher stream of earnings if they do break into the formal sector. The extent of the 'cut' will depend on the differential in wages between the formal sector and the rural area, and on the probability of obtaining a job in the formal sector. ' (ii) A distinction has to be made between the daily wage rate and the average earnings of labour in the 'informal' sector. It is by no means certain that even if entry is easy for labour in this sector, the daily wage rate will be equated to the jisutility price of a day's work. The wage rate in a labour market is strongly influenced by the community's idea of a generally acceptable 'social minimum' and also by the demonstration effect of the wage rate in the 'formal' sector. If this minimum is significantly above the disutility price of a day's labour there will be competition for the available number of jobs on any particular day. The labour market in the 'informal' sector is usually organized along the lines of a casual labour market. Thus, the over-supply of labour does not lead to total unemployment of a portion of the labour force, but to a sharing out of the available jobs among the job-seekers, so that over the period of a month everybody gets a certain number of days of work. 2 Equilibritim in the market is established so that the average earnings of a job-seeker for the month is equated to his supply price (ignoring the point made in the last paragraph). Thus, the opportunity cost of labour in the urban sector should be nearer the average eamings of a worker in the informal sector than the wage rate.
(iii) Apart from this problem of measuring the 'true' supply price of labour by looking at the wage/earnings data in the 'informal' urban market, we must take into account the consumption effect of creating an additional job in the 'formal' sector. It seems likely that when migrants are financing themselves during their jo1 search by working in the informal sector, the consumption effect will b> more significant than when they were being financed by their rural famiLes.
Let us then follow the same procedure as in the models in Sections I and II for estimating the shadow wage. We assume that migrants to the urban market expect to obtain employment in the urban formal sector, but if they fail to do so are not totally unemployed, but find some employment in the urban informal sector. The seekers of formal sector jobs-defined as U in the models of Sections I and II-are in this case the total number employed (though not full-time) in the informal sector. Iae average earnings of a worker in the informal sector is not exogenously given, but is determined by the conditions of equilibrium in the urban market.
A model of the urban labour market
A simple model of the urban labour market could be formulated by making a reasonably realistic assumption about the linkages between the two subsectors in the process of income generation in the market. It is assumed that the informal or unorganized sector (U-sector) sells its output entirely to the population in the urban market-who derive their income from the U-sector as well as from the formal or 'organized' sector (0-sector). The 0-sector, however, sells much of its output to the population outside this particular urban mrarket. 1 Consequently, U-sector output is dependent on the income of the 0-sector but 0-sector output is autonomously determined.
Let y = the productiviV.y of a worker in the 0-sector at a point of time Y = yN = the income produced in the 0-sector P = the income produced in the U-sector = the marginal propensity to consume U-goods on the part of the U-sector = the marginal propensity to consume U-goods for the 0-sector.
Then, we have,
The total demand for goods and services from the informal sector gets randomly distributed among the workers found in the sector. Since each worker is as good (or as lucky) as another, the income generated in this sector is thus shared equally by all the workers participating in the sector, so that we get average earnings in the sector determined by the following:
The probability of getting an 0-sector job for those now in the U-sector is as given in Section II: P-u N as9in (4 a).
The equilibrium condition for migration will now have to be redefined to take into account the possibility of the migrant finding some work in the U-sector if be does not succeed in breaking into the 0-sector. This means that, in t.rms of the analysis of the determination of the equilibrium volume of migration presented in the last section, the migrants receive an 'unemployment pay' equal to gW during their period of search. Thus the equilibrium condition given by equation (21) remains unchanged, but we note, in this case, with family income maximization h = g, and j = m. But with pure personal income maximization h = a-m+g, and j = a.
The value of g is determined endogenously in the system. P is determined by (22). The three equations (21), (23), and (4 a) are sufficient to determine simultanieously the three unknowns p, g, and U.
What 1lrptpi.i when N changes? Generally by altering the probability of getting an 0-sector job it will h~ave an effect on U, so that g changes: and if the ax erage earnings in the U-sector changes we can expect to see further feedlb.acks on P (and hence g) through changes in a and Pi. It is, however, possible to conceive of a state of dynamic equilibrium in the labour market, in which g remains unchanged over time for a given value of y, and it is this value of g which should enter into the calculation of the shadow wage for this type of model.
The requirements for the dynamic equilibrium in which employment and earnings in both the urban subsectors grow at the same rate are twofold: (i) a and Pi remain constant so that the multiplier mechanism of equation (22) ensures that the growth rates of income in the two urban subsectors are equalized over time; and (ii) labour productivity and wage in the urban formal sector grow at the same rate as the supply price of labour in the rural sector, and the productivity of a day's work in the urban informal sector also grows a.t this rate. This second condition implies that the growth rates of employment in the two urban subsectors are the same, and that average earninlgs in the U-sector increase at the same rate as the 0-sector wage and the supply price of rural migrants. ' Given these conditions a particular value of y will determine the ratios of employ rmenit anc earnings in the two urban subsectors, as it determined the equilibriumn rate of unemploymeiit in the model of Section II. Thus the values of these ratios ais well as that of p can be determined for any date on the growtth path from the system of equations already given for the static model. AXc iio) 1.IunII to the det;ermunation of the shadow wage in the steady state charactlerized by a pa.-Aicular value of y. It should be remembered that the shadow wage thus calculated has a cont,tant value relative to the 0-sector market wage W-and hence it will have a time trend same as W. This factor will have to be taken into accoount in using the SWVR for the evaluation of projects having a life longer than one time period.
Deritvation of the shadow wage
The migration function in this model is the same as in tha model of Section II and is implicit in the specification of p in equation (4 a). When one more worker is employed in the formal urban sector, {y(l-p)+l}/p migrants are attracted to the urban area. These migrants participate in the urban informal sector and have earnings equal to gW.
The loss in output due to this migration is (i) the fall in agricultural output as in the previous models minus (ii) thie increase in the output of the urban informal sector. Thus the loss in output
The increase in consumption in the economy will include three elements: (i) The worker employed in the formal sector increases his consumption by (W-gW).
(ii) The migrants coming into the urban informal sector suffer a loss in consumption. Assuming they were sharing equally in the family pot in the rural area, the loss in consumption is (AP-gW).
(iii) The families from which the migrants come gain in income (and consumption) to the extent of (AP-MP) for each migrant.
Thus, the total increase in consumption:
Using the familiar L-M formula, the value of the shadow wage in thiE model then reduce.ti to: 
SW== W-IW-gW-dL (MPd-g WL
From (21 a) and (26);
Compare this expression with the formulation for the SWB given in the case of family income maximization with rural financing (i.e. without the informal sector of Section II). Substituting the appropriate value of p in equation (13), p. 414, the interesting result is reached that the expression for the SWR is exactly the same as in equation (26 a).
A more intuitive understanding of this result is possible if we remember that in both cases-with or without the informal sector-the decisio:n on migration is being taken by the rural family as a unit when we have family income maximization. Ill the model with the informal sector the loss in output per migrant is reduced by gW compared with the situation in which the migrant remained unemployed during the period of search. But the cost to the family unit of migation is reduced by exactly ths amount, so that we get more migration. given v and i, in the present case. The two effects cancel each other out, giving an identical value for the shadow wage, provided that the discounting factor applied by migrants (i) is the same in the case of rural and self-financing.
There is, however, no reason to presume that the value of i will be the same in the two cases. With expected capital market imperfections in LDCs, migrants will have a substantially higher i if they have to be financed by their rural families than if they financed their irrban living by participating in the informal sector. Thus the ratio of EA7R/W could be significantly higher in the present case in spite of the identical expressions for the shadow wage. In particular, the conclusion reached at the end of Section II -that for all practical purposes the SWWR in a model with induced migration would not be very much greater than the L-Mresult-need not hold for the current model. 1 The S WB could indeed be higher than the market wage. The condition for this is, however, stringent and is in the following form (26 a) >
Since y is small, i has to be very low indeed for this condition to be met. Finally, with personal income maximization the decisions by migrants are taken as individuals separated from the rural family. The fKl in output DIPAK MIAZUMDAR 423 per migrant is (mn-g)W rather than mW as in tlho model without the informal sector. Tho finance available to the migrant during his search period is also different: (a-m)WTV in the model without the informal sector, and gW in the informal sector case. Using these values in the equations (21) forp, and substituting for p in equations (13) and (26) we get the following expressions for the SWV? in the two cases:
For personal income maximization with rural financing:
With informal sector financing:
In either case the S WR is smaller than in the corresponding family maximization case. Thus the conditions for the SWB/W to be equal to or greater than unity are more stringent.
Conclusions
The paper explored the various expressions for the shadow wage which emerge when we try to combine the effects of the loss in output in the alternative occupation, the extra consumption involved, and of induced migration in the presence of an institutionally determined (high) wagre in the urban formal sector. Two types of migration function implicit in the definition of the probability of getting an urban job were discussed, as were two different methods of financing the migranit during his period of search for an urban formal sector job.
1. The proposition that the shadow wage should equal the Inarket wage when we take into account induced migration (et la Harberger-itiglitz) does not depend on the condition that the equilibrium rate of unemployment in the urbani market is stable. It is crucially dependent, on the other hand, oni the assumption of a migration function which predicts an exaggerated rate of urban unemployment anid hence an exaKggerated volume of induced migration (Stiglitz's multi-period model which gives this result is dealt with in the Appenidix).
2. With a more reasonable defiiition of thle migration function it was showvn in Section II that the effect of induced inig,ration on the shiadowv wvage wilU be small wlhen there is 'rural financinia' of the job-seeker in tlhe urban -market, and tlho ,Al result is only sligyhtly modified. 3. In Sectioni III the valtue of tlle shadow wage was considered when migrants financed themselves by participating in the informal sector. An expressioni for thc S lJPJ couild be derived for a labour market with a dynamic equilibrium growth in whliclh a specific (constant) value of y deterinines not 424 RURAb-ITRBAN WAGE GAP, MIGRATION, AND SHADOW WAGE only the proportion of employment in the informal sector (in the same way as the rate of unemployment in the model of Section II), but also the ratio of earnings in the sector to the formal sector wage. It was seen tlat primarily because migrants could be expected to apply a lower discount rate to their expected income stream, the induced migration effect could be significant and the shadow wage may exceed the market wage dependirng on the actual magnitudes of the variables involved.
We do not as yet have detailed knowledge about the urban labour markets of LD Cs to assess which type of financing of the rural-urban migrant is more dominant. The large (and probably growing) size of the in-formal sector is apparent in most urban markets of the LDCs. But it does not follow that the hypothesis of Section III-that migrants are able to search for jobs in the 'formal' sector simultaneously as they earn a living wage in the 'informal' sector-is necessarily valid. It should be remembered that the job-seekers have to compete for the available volume of work in the 'informal' sector with another type of migrant who is interested in doing a spell Awork in the 'informal' sector as an end in itself and under certain conditions the latter might be the dominant group in this sector. ' International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Development Economics Department, Washington, D.C. It is seemingly based on a multi-period model, but is not really so because of its neglect of the problem of financing and the rate of discount. Stiglitz,'s argument is as follows:
Let D be the expected duration on the job (t= l/q) Xu be the expected duration of unemployment. Now tu will be equal to I/p, p being the probability of being hired at any period. Apart from the special assumptions of family income maximization and zero net growth in employment, the model allows for only one aspect of the problem of search: i.e. there is net loss of the alternative output (= MP) per period during the period of waiting. The cost of maintenance of the job-seekers during this period is ignored. Even if we assume with rural financing and family income maxinization that t-he family maintains the job-seekers in town at the level of consumption they would have earned in the village anyway (with no compensation for cost-of-living differences) there would be a net cost due to the urban income stream starting at a later date than it would have if the migrants had stayed at home. This cost should have been taken care of by obtaining present values at the appropriate rate of discount, and for the appropriate periods of time involved.
